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Emphasis on both moral character and talent in selecting government officials has 
been an intrinsic part of China’s meritocratic tradition.
1
 From early on, 
mainstream Chinese political philosophy, particularly of the Confucian heritage, 
has promoted such an ideal. This quest, however, has also encountered perennial 
challenges in practice. In this chapter, we examine in historic context the ideal 
and practice of integrating moral character with talent in selecting government 
officials. We show that, despite difficulties, searching for virtuous talent in China 
today has evolved into the most comprehensive and sophisticated process of its 
kind in history. The first section of this chapter retrieves the history of China’s 
civil examinations and its problems. The second section investigates recent 
evolutions of China’s public servant recruitment as a stepping stone into 
officialdom. The third section focuses on China’s recent reform in the selection of 
government officials. Finally, we examine to what extent the reformed system 
causes corruption in China. 
 A  I. A Brief History of China’s Civil Service Examinations 
The long and complex history of China’s civil service examinations has been 
studied extensively.
2
 We do not intend to present a comprehensive or balanced 
history here. Building on work by others, we highlight some points and aspects to 
set the stage for our argument. 
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The ideal of selecting people of both moral character and talent to serve in 
government has its roots in ancient China. Moral character, or de, symbolizes 
virtuous personality. Talent, neng 能 or cai 才, refers primarily, but not 
exclusively, to a person’s ability in discharging official duties. Persons equipped 
with both traits are called xian 贤, the worthy.3 It has long been believed that 
government should recruit virtuous and talented people to serve the country.
4
 This 
ideal was gradually established during the Spring-and-Autumn period
5
 and 
subsequently implemented as government policy. Ancient thinkers, however, 
have attributed such practice to the earliest periods of Chinese history. The 
Confucian classic Book of History records a story of the early king Yao looking 
for a senior minister. He passed over his son Zhu and a talented minister 
Gonggong. According to the text, Zhu was smart but immodest; Gonggong 
successfully controlled devastating floods but was irreverent toward Heaven 
(tian). Then local lords insisted on appointing Gun. Yao reluctantly agreed, 
although he regarded Gun as disobedient. It turned out that Gun did not do a good 
job.
6
 This story suggests the importance of moral character for selecting 
government officials; without moral character, talent alone does not produce good 
results. When King Yao was to select a successor, he asked local lords for 
recommendations. They suggested Shun. Living in a dysfunctional family, Shun’s 
father lacked virtue, and his stepmother was inconsiderate. He also had an 
arrogant and obnoxious brother. Yet Shun managed to maintain harmony in the 
family and to remain a filial son and a caring brother. Therefore, Yao chose Shun 
as the candidate to succeed to the throne. Shun was first appointed as the general 
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minister. He did well: the people emulated his virtues, government officials 
followed his directions, and guests from all quarters received by him rendered 
their respect. When he was stationed at the foot of the mountains, he did not go 
astray even amid tempests of wind, thunder, and rain. After three years, Shun 
proved himself as an able leader and was given the throne. This story indicates 
the Confucian ideal that government should be in the hands of people of virtue 
and talent.
7
 Two points in this story are worth noting. First, the Confucian view 
does not separate “private” virtues from public morals. So-called private virtues 
are taken as good indications of a person’s character and, hence, his (or her) 
ability to be a good public figure. Second, the ability to harmonize one’s family is 
a key virtue in Confucianism and has been accorded primary importance in 
evaluating a person’s character. The assumption is that if a person does not do 
well within his own family, it is difficult, if not impossible, for him to work well 
with others beyond family. Both viewpoints hold to this day (see Section 2 of this 
chapter). 
The historian Qian Mu’s study shows that selecting government officials 
became a systematic practice during the Western Han dynasty (202 B.C.E.–9 C.E.). 
Government selected officials mainly in three ways. The first was to look for 
virtuous talents (xian liang 贤良). For this category, the emphasis seemed to be 
on talent, provided that those selected were also virtuous. Candidates included 
both government officials at lower levels and those without a government post. 
Upon recommendation by government agencies at various levels, candidates were 
interviewed or tested on government policies. When successful, they were then 
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appointed to government posts. The second category was for people who were 
filial at home and for government employees, usually at low ranks, who were 
honest and clean on their job (xiao lian 孝廉). The emphasis in this category was 
on moral character. This practice was meant to reward people with good morals. 
During the Wudi period (141–87 B.C.E.), whether local governments could find 
such people in their districts was taken as an indication of the effectiveness of 
government performance, on the presumption that such people exist in well-
governed society. During the Eastern Han (25–220 C.E.), examinations for talent 
were added to screening candidates of this category to ensure competence on the 
job. The last category of selecting government officials took place when there 
was a need for special talents, such as flood control experts and envoys to foreign 
countries. This category appeared to focus more on talent than moral quality. 




According to the Wangzhi chapter of the classical Book of Rites, in ancient 
China the selection of scholar-officials began at the level of local districts (xiang). 
Top scholars at that level were awarded the title of “Excellent Scholar” (xiu shi). 
When they became selected at an upper level, they were given the title of “Select 
Scholar” (xuan shi) and the responsibility of teaching others. Those exceling as 
“Select Scholars” were further educated to become “Outstanding Scholars” (jun 
shi). The highest achievers were “Accomplished Scholars” (zao shi). Both 
“Outstanding Scholars” and “Accomplished Scholars” were granted the privilege 
of exemption from draft to labor for the state.
9
 The text also indicates that for all 
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good talents to serve in government, they should be discussed (lun) and examined 
(bian) before they were assigned to appropriate posts. This record indicates a 
general philosophy of not only how virtuous talents should be selected but also 
how they should be rewarded. 
During the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) periods, selection by 
recommendation was replaced with selection by examinations (keju). The Tang 
system of selection comprised two steps. The first was examination for 
candidacy. The second step involved government appointments made from the 
candidate pool.
10
 Benjamin Elman’s study shows that under the Tang emperors 
Gao-zu (r. 618–26) and Tai-zong (r. 627–50), candidates first took qualifying 
examinations (ju). To enter officialdom, they had to undergo a selection process 
(xuan) that evaluated candidates’ moral character and determined the level of 
appointment. Selection criteria included candidates’ deportment, eloquence, 
calligraphy, and legal knowledge. The entire qualification and appointment 
process was called xuanu,
11
 a term that has evolved to mean election. 
Civil service examinations continued through subsequent dynasties. The 
examination system had far-reaching consequences in history. For one thing, it 
provided a channel for the aspirations of men of ability (women were excluded) 
from almost every social stratum. Although success in the examinations was 
easier for people with well-off family backgrounds, poor scholars also succeeded 
in their ambitions, although to a lesser degree. Pertinent information in this regard 
is largely unobtainable. Available records, however, indicate the possibility of 
impressive social upward mobility through civil service examinations. In 1148 
during the Song dynasty, for example, 330 people successfully passed national 
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civil service examinations (jin shi). Of the 279 graduates with family information 
on record, 157 had no forebears in civil service versus 122 with forebears who 
had served in government. The year 1156 witnessed 601 examination graduates. 
Of the 572 individuals with family background information on record, 331 did not 
have forebears in civil service as opposed to 241 with forebears in civil service.
12
 
Those without forebears in civil service may have come from economically well-
off families. But given that social status in ancient China was gauged heavily on 
government positions, entering civil service through successful passage of 
examinations was undoubtedly a major upgrade in social status for individuals 
and their families. Another major effect of the examination system is to enhance 
social stability. The possibility of moving up the social ladder through 
examinations, although a mere dream for the vast majority, nevertheless provided 
people with ambitions some hope in life so they would not seek deviatory means 
in pursuing aspirations. This feature was particularly salient during transitions 
between dynasties. When a new dynasty called to recruit the “virtuous and 
talented” to serve in government, it also required people’s submission to the new 
ruler. An unintended consequence of the civil examinations, as Benjamin Elman’s 
study shows, was the creation of legions of classically literate men (and women), 
who used their linguistic talents for a variety of nonofficial purposes, from literati 
physicians to local pettifoggers, from fiction writers to examination essay 
teachers. There we find a healthy degree of social mobility (or “circulation” as 
Elman calls it) for members of the lower classes to rise in the social hierarchy.
13
 
According to Qian Mu, examination subjects during the Tang period were 




presumption seems to be that people who were good at these subjects would be 
competent in government posts. It is questionable, however, whether such persons 
also possessed moral character and practical skills for the job. Some ancient 
thinkers seemed to consider this kind of examinations adequate for selecting 
virtuous talents. The prominent scholar-official Han Yu (768–824), for example, 
held that learning to write is itself a moral exercise, a matter of nourishing one’s 
qi (vital energy). He wrote: 
 EXT  Qi is water and words are floating objects. When the water is great, 
all floating things, large or small, float equally. Qi’s relationship to words 
is similar to this. When one’s qi is flourishing, the length of his words and 
the pitch of his voice are all fitting.. . . (The cultivated person) places his 
heart in the moral way and behaves appropriately. When he is in office, he 
applies the Dao to people. When he has quit office, he teaches the Dao to 
students and passes his writings to later generations as a model.
15
 
For Han, writing is not an isolated technique or skill. It is a dimension integral to 
a person’s whole being, which manifests the state of one’s cultivated qi.
16
 Just as 
objects float only when there is adequate water,
17
 a person writes well only when 
adequate effort has been exerted in successfully cultivating his qi. The ability to 
write well is therefore a good indication of holistic self-cultivation. Accordingly, 
examining a person’s writing ability would at the same time reveal his moral 
quality and talent. 
Han may have overstated the linkage between writing and personal 
cultivation, however. Although good writing skills may indicate discipline and an 
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important ability for performance in governmental office, they are not reliable 
measurements for either moral character or administrative competence on the job. 
Examinations in themselves did not provide necessary preparations for these 
qualities, nor did they adequately measure them. To recruit people of both moral 
refinement and practical talent, additional measures were needed to complement 
literary examinations. Qian Mu noted that, in early periods, candidates were 
mostly from established families. Their family backgrounds provided them with 
adequate knowledge and familiarity with rules of politics (e.g., office practice) 
and ritual propriety (li jiao). By the time of an appointment, they were already 
fairly well equipped with these necessary qualities and skills for the job. 
Examination graduates without adequate family education in politics and ritual 
propriety, however, were ill prepared for effective performance on the job.
18
 
Subjects of examinations remained largely unchanged during the Song 
period (960–1279). Although examinations provided a platform for upward social 
mobility and thus aspirations for people at various layers of society, their flaws 
were obvious. Cheng Yi (1033–1107) lamented that the formal, detailed, legally 
prescribed literary requirements in preparation for the examinations were of no 
use in evaluating the moral worth of the students.
19
 Zhu Xi (1130–1200) also 
criticized that state academies failed to evaluate students’ moral quality or actual 
ability on the job; they only encouraged students’ desires for personal gains rather 
than moral rightness.
20
 In an essay on the civil examination, Zhu proposed 
reforming the system to take into consideration candidates’ ability in job 
performance: 
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 EXT  [Zhu] wanted his candidates to think, and to know how to think for 
themselves; in studying the Classics, they should study not only the 
classical texts but also the commentaries of different schools of 
interpreters, and in answering a question should be prepared to cite 
different opinions, concluding with their own judgment.
21
 
In Zhu’s view, these critical-thinking qualities are important for problem solving 
in practice, and they are part of a person’s integrated self-cultivation. Zhu 
believed that if his proposal were to be adopted, “men’s minds would be 
composed and there would be no spirit of hustling and striving; there would be 
actual virtuous conduct and none of the corruption of empty words; there would 
be solid learning and no unusable talent.”
22
 Without such a reform, civil service 
examinations were unable to generate virtuous talents to serve the country and 
would be detrimental to it. Zhu said, “[I]f the government wishes to recapture the 




Zhu’s worry was not unusual in the history of China’s civil service 
examinations. David Nivison’s study shows that the idea of doing away with the 
examinations, and of filling the ranks of government officials by recommendation 
of the “virtuous” from below, was resurrected from time to time in Chinese 
history. Nivison writes, 
 EXT  The surprising fact is that throughout all this we find the 
examination-education complex, the function and effect of which was to 
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ensure the dominance of the Confucian classical tradition, criticized 
precisely by appeal to Confucian moral, aesthetic, and political values.
24
 
Critics of examinations seemed to have focused primarily on their ineffectiveness 
in selecting people who were both virtuous and talented, particularly the former. 
The Song scholar-official Wang Anshi (1021–1086) complained that, under the 
examination system, when children should concentrate on learning the moral truth 
in the world, they were made to study poetry and rhymed prose behind closed 
doors; and when they were in government office, they had absolutely no 
experience with affairs in the real world. “This examination system destroys 
talents and makes today’s world pale in comparison with ancient times.”
25
 Later, 
the Ming scholar Wang Tingxiang (1474–1544) also lamented, “today’s 
examination system does not look into people’s moral character and conduct, and 
merely selects individuals on their writing. No wonder it only selects people of 
poor quality for offices.”
26
 
It was not that only Confucian scholars of the time were concerned about 
the moral inadequacy in the examination systems. Benjamin Elman’s study of the 
examinations in the Ming (1368–1644) and the Qing (1644–1911) shows that the 
moral cultivation of the literati was a perennial concern of the imperial court 
because it sought to ensure that the officials it chose in the examination market 
would serve the people in the name of the ruling family.
27
 In reality, however, the 
examination system as practiced in history fell far short of the ideal of selecting 
people who were both virtuous and talented. 
 12 
Because of this failure, throughout the history of civil examinations, 
recommendation on the basis of both ability and moral character has been a 
recurring theme. As indicated earlier, the practice of government recruitments on 
recommendation has a long history. According to a study by E. A. Kracke, Jr., 
 EXT  From the earliest clearly historical times, recommendation was not 
merely sanctioned as an open practice; the recommendation of worthy and 
able men became at least a moral obligation, possibly reinforced by 
penalties for its neglect. By the early second century B.C., if not earlier, 
recommendation had assumed institutional form.
28
 
From King Yao looking for his own successor to the Han court’s selection of the 
filial and the uncorrupt for government posts, recommendation on the basis of 
moral character has been an important way of selecting virtuous talent. During the 
Song period, the method of recommendation for civil service was used in 
complementing competitive examinations. The government identified qualified 
sponsors, primarily on their personal quality, especially moral character. Sponsors 
then recommended candidates for promotion to more important positions in civil 
service on the basis of several criteria. Among these were vigor, discipline, 
caution, and noncorruption. Candidates must have demonstrated firmness and 
confidence. They must be free from presumption, impropriety, or the misuse of 
authority. Caution was considered the third important quality as it is for anyone 
with considerable responsibilities. Finally and most important, candidates must 




Although these were not testable on examinations, recommendation 
provided a useful way for selecting suitable people. Once a recommended 
candidate was appointed to a government post, his sponsor served as a mentor and 
was held responsible for his protégé’s job performance. Records are unavailable 
regarding how many or what proportion of people were promoted to senior 
positions in government via recommendation during the Song dynasty; 
recommendation as a supplement to examinations, however, appeared to have 




Recommendation was a useful means to supplement and strengthen the 
examination method, but it placed a great amount of power in the hands of 
sponsors. This would work well only if sponsors were reliably virtuous people 
whose only interest is the good of society. From today’s perspective, this method 
has at least two problems. First, it opens doors to nepotism. If it were practiced 
today, sponsors would likely fight for opportunities to place their own protégés. 
Second, in the modern context of individuality, it is difficult to determine the 
recommender’ responsibility when his protégé fails. For example, how much 
responsibility should the recommender bears if his protégé, after an outstanding 
start on a new job, becomes corrupt five years after taking office? What about ten 
years later or even longer? Although recommendation may still play a role in 
selecting government appointees, it cannot play as important a role as it used to in 
history. The search for reliable ways to select people who are both virtuous and 
talented continues. 
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 A  II. Current Civil Service Examinations 
The imperial examination system was abolished in 1905, but examinations remain 
big affairs in China today. There are two major examinations. One is the 
university entrance examination, called gao kao, or the “examination for entrance 
into higher education.” According to China Education Online, from 1977 to 2010, 
152 million contestants participated in the gao kao, and 66.61 million were 
admitted to universities.
31
 In 2011 alone, 9.33 million people took the gao kao, 
and 6.75 million were granted university admissions. The gao kao is also called 
da kao, meaning both the “examination for university entrance” and the “big 
examination.” For Chinese families with children, this examination is indeed the 
greatest affair in their lives. Acquiring a university seat is not only important for 
receiving an education, it is also a crucial move in upward social mobility, for 
which a good university degree is a requirement, with few exceptions, for 
obtaining good jobs, especially highly competitive civil service jobs, and for 
future promotions.
32
 Success in the gao kao is the first step in climbing today’s 
meritocratic social ladder. 
The other major examination is for civil service (gongwuyuan kaoshi). 
Civil service examinations take place both at the national and local levels. 
Examinations at the national level are called guo kao, the “examination for 
national civil service” or simply the “national examination.” The guo kao is an 
examination for appointments in the central government and its direct branches. 
Others are for civil service posts at the provincial level (sheng kao) and below. 
These examinations draw participants from all walks of life to compete for 
particularly desirable posts at various levels of government. These jobs are highly 
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sought-after not only because they come with job security, excellent benefits, 
social prestige, and potential personal advantages often associated with 
government offices, but also because they are the primary passage for promotion 
to more important offices in government. In China, there is no difference between 
the tracks of professional civil servants (shiwu guan) and political appointees 
(zhengwu guan). With few exceptions, all senior positions have to be filled by 
candidates from the pool of civil servants.
33
 
Today, more people than ever attempt to climb the social ladder through 
examinations. Approximately 1.5 million people registered for the 2013 national 
civil service examinations, competing for 20,800 posts,
34
 up from 2012 when 
more than 1.3 million people registered, competing for 18,000 positions.
35
 Two of 
the most sought-after posts drew 9,411 and 9,175 examination participants, 
respectively.
36
 These situations have given rise to the expression, “a colossal 
army passes through a bridge made of a single log.” 
In addition to the high desirability of these positions, the overly 
competitive situation is in part due to a large pool of qualified candidates looking 
for employment. In 1977, when China’s universities first reopened after the 
Cultural Revolution, 4.8 percent of 5,700,000 university examination participants, 
or 270,000, were admitted to universities. In 2011, 72 percent of 9,330,000 
participants, or 6,750,000, were offered admissions. Increasingly, large numbers 
of university graduates place tremendous pressure on the job market; civil service 
examinations offer at least a nominal hope, even though the majority of applicants 
know that they have little chance of success in the competition. 
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Today’s civil service examinations differ from the ancient keju in several 
ways. Contents of the examinations now include general and specialized subjects. 
Under general subjects are general civil knowledge, administrative abilities and 
aptitudes, and problem-solving essays. Specialized subjects are discipline- (or 
position-) specific. Those passing written examinations successfully are then 
interviewed before final selections are made. During the Tang dynasty, success in 
the keju gave candidates only the qualification for official posts; examination 
graduates only made it to the pool from which actual appointments were to be 
made by the ministry of personnel. During the Song dynasty, all successful 
candidates from examinations above the provincial level were automatically 
appointed to government offices. Success in today’s civil service examinations 
likewise means immediate appointment in government offices, because the 
success rate is set at the exact number of available openings. Unlike the Song 
practice, however, these appointments are usually office staff positions rather than 
senior positions. In most cases, staff appointments admit candidates into a select 
pool for further competition down the road in pursuit of more important 
government positions. 
Although the government commands a “buyer’s market” in selecting civil 
servants and professional training of public servants may have significantly 
improved over the years, the moral quality of civil servants appears to have 
deteriorated. Since its reforms and opening-up in late 1970s, China has been 
increasingly infested with corruption, particularly among government officials. 
With power and influence attached to government offices, occupants are prone to 
abusing public trust and to becoming primary targets for bribes. Every year, a 
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large number of government officials are arrested at every level for corruption. 
From October 1997 to September 2002, ninety-eight officials at the minister-
governor rank (sheng-bu ji), 2,422 officials at the rank immediately below (si-jü 
ji), and, further down, 28,996 officials at the level of county mayor or ministerial 
office director (xian-chu ji) were penalized for corruption.
37
 In 2002 alone, 3,269 
corruption cases involved government officials at or above the level of county 
mayor or ministerial office director.
38
 In 2010, 139,621 corruption cases were 
investigated; 146,517 government officials were disciplined by the Communist 
Party internally, and 5,373 of these were handed over to the court.
39
 It is believed, 
however, that these are merely the tip of the iceberg. Fighting corruption has 
become a matter of life and death for the ruling Party.
40
 Moral deterioration in 
society, particularly among government officials, has caused serious concerns 
with the moral quality of public servants in general. 
It is against this backdrop that the government recently proposed measures 
for ethical screening in the guo kao and for ethics education of civil servants. In 
October 2011, the State Administration of Civil Service announced that future 
recruitments will take candidates’ moral quality into consideration. According to 
one report, future civil service examinations will be based first on candidates’ 
moral character, followed by their talent and interview performance: “Candidates 
who lack political integrity, a sense of social responsibility, and a willingness to 
serve the public will not be allowed to become civil servants.”
41
 So far, no formal 
policies have been put in place for screening candidates’ moral character in civil 
servant examinations, and it is unclear how this is actually to be implemented. It 
would surely be difficult, if not impossible, to test personal moral quality with 
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examinations. Following the announcement, the Xinhua Net conducted an online 
survey, finding that only 14 percent the 7,200 respondents approved the proposed 
measure, whereas 86 percent feared that it may be abused for opening 
“backdoors” in recruiting civil servants.
42
 
In the meantime, the State Administration of Civil Service also published 
“Outlines for Professional Ethics Training of Civil Servants,” making ethical 
education part of the ongoing maintenance of civil service personnel. The outlines 
aim to enhance civil servants’ “professional ethics.” These include ten basic areas 
of moral knowledge and four themes: 
<listing> 
1. The meaning and function of ethics and professional ethics. 
2. The meaning and function of professional ethics for civil 
servants. 
3. Civil servants’ responsibility, duty, and discipline. 
4. Civil servants’ worldview, view of power, and view of career. 
5. Ancient Chinese view on cultivating virtuous government 
officials. 
6. The main contents of socialist core values. 
7. The government’s requirements of anticorruption and integrity-
building among civil servants. 
8. Main contents, features, and measures of professional ethics for 
civil servants in other countries. 
9. The significance of professional ethics enhancement among 
civil servants. 
10. Principles and methods of professional ethics enhancement 
among civil servants. 
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</listing> 
The four themes are 
<listing> 
1. Loyalty to the Country 
2. The Fundamental Goal of Serving the People 
3. Dutifulness 




Embedded in these are both moral and political connotations. The item of 
“socialist core values,” for example, obviously has a political overtone. The 
definition of “loyalty to the country” includes “firmly upholding the leadership of 
the Chinese Communist Party” and “maintaining uniformity with the Party in 
thought, politics, and action.”
44
 This reflects the persistent pattern of the PRC 
government’s longtime conflation of the party and the country. Disloyalty to the 
party is portrayed as disloyalty to the country. It should also be noted that the 
emphasis on “uniformity with the Party in thought, politics, and action” goes 
directly against the traditional Confucian value of “harmony with differences (he 
er bu tong).” Confucian classical teachings explicitly emphasize the importance 
of different voices in the government. The Shaogong 20 chapter of the Zuozhuan, 
for instance, spells out that, when the minister always keeps in uniformity with 
the ruler, there is only sameness rather than harmony; harmony requires a healthy 
interaction of different opinions.
45
 
The majority of the guidelines, however, are of an ethical nature. For 
example, “enhancing responsibility consciousness,” “honesty,” “integrity,” and 
“seeking no personal gain in office.” Moreover, there are even items about 
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“promoting traditional virtues” and “abiding by social ethics and family ethics.”
46
 
The guidelines set the goal of placing every civil servant through such training 
during 2011–2015. 
Whether this kind of training is effective remains to be seen. We can hope, 
however, the training can serve at least as a reminder to civil servants of their 
duty and ethical obligations on the job. It is far from clear whether these 
guidelines, or similar material, will be used for future civil service examinations, 
and if they are, whether they can be a meaningful measure of professional ethics 
of civil servants. 
 A  III. Recent Reform Toward “Scientific and Democratic” 
Selections 
China’s current civil service system in effect separates recruitment from 
promotion. Although currently there is no specific requirement on candidates’ 
moral character for civil service examinations besides absence of criminal record, 
promotion of public servants is more demanding in this regard. After decades of 
evolution and reform, promotion within civil service today takes into 
consideration candidates’ qualifications in multiple dimensions, including civic 
knowledge, professional ability, moral character, and political reliability. 
In 2004, the government implemented a policy of “Promotion through 
Competition (jingzheng shanggang),” institutionalizing competitive promotion of 
civil servants, up to deputy directors at the departmental level in ministries or 
provincial governments (fu-ju ji).
47
 The policy stipulates that promotions must be 
carried out on the principles of openness, fairness, and justice, on the basis of a 
combination of examinations and inspection by upper administration. Article 27 
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of the policy states that there must not be any “pre-chosen internal candidate,” 
that procedures cannot be altered in the middle of the process, that unpublicized 
information and contents of the examinations are strictly kept confidential, among 
other stipulations. 
The promotion process takes several steps. First, when there is a vacancy, 
interested individuals must submit applications and pass qualification screenings. 
The policy does not specify criteria for qualification screenings; it refers to 
another government document published in 2002, “Regulations regarding 
Promotion to Party and Government Leadership Positions.”
48
 That document 
contains specific guidelines for promotion of civil servants. For example, 
applicants for positions at the level of county mayor or ministerial office director 
(xian-chu ji) must have had working experience at a level immediately below it 
(Article 6). It also stipulates that candidacies may be generated through 
“democratic nominations,” a process that includes self-nomination and 
nomination by others. In the second stage of the promotion process, candidates 
must take written examinations and must pass interviews successfully. These 
examinations are localized and usually position-specific. Examinations are 
important as the scores determine whether a candidate can move forward in the 
process and his or her ranking vis-à-vis other candidates. Unlike civil service 
examinations in ancient times, however, these examinations are not the sole 
determining factor in securing appointments. They are only one of the several 
steps in the process of selection. The 2002 policy stipulates that subjects of the 
examinations and interviews must include job-related knowledge and skills 
(Articles 14 and 15). The interviewing committee must consist of at least seven 
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members, including upper-level administrators, human resources staff, and 
professional experts; it should also include members from outside the agency. 
Individuals with conflicts of interest are to be recused. To maintain transparency, 
interviewing processes are open to public observation within the same agency 
(Article 16). Third, there will be a “democratic assessment” and inspection by 
human resources officers. During the “democratic assessment,” public input is 
solicited (Article 19). Background checks are then conducted. Finally, 
appointment decisions are to be made by the party leadership in the institution or 
its supervising agency (Article 24). 
The 2004 policy marks a major move toward a comprehensive scheme in 
selecting civil servants for senior positions. Although the practice inherits 
traditional methods of examinations and selections by superiors, new mechanisms 
are incorporated. Article 1 of the policy states that promotion processes must be 
“scientific, democratic, and institutionalized.” To be “scientific” means to be 
realistic and relevant to job qualifications. This is manifested mainly in two ways. 
First, examination subjects are on knowledge and skills closely related to the job. 
In this regard, it signifies a meaningful departure from ancient examinations. 
Ancient Chinese civil service examinations focused mainly on Confucian classics. 
Although the significance of these classics is not to be underestimated, they can at 
best provide moral and political guidance but do not help with specific skills for 
job performance. The second main area of the “scientific” move is in requiring 
professional experts and individuals familiar with the position to serve on 
interviewing committees. This makes interviews more pertinent and more 
reliable. One of Max Weber’s characteristics of modern bureaucracy is that 
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modern office management requires expert training.
49
 The “scientific” turn in the 
policy in part answers to that requirement. It enhances the mechanism for search 
after talents. 
Whereas the “scientific” characteristic focuses mainly on the “talent” side 
of the search, the “democratic” dimension covers moral character as well as 
talent. The selection process is an “open” one; it includes “democratic 
nominations” as well as “public input and feedback.” This practice reduces 
nepotism and makes it more likely to select candidates with a broad base of 
support. To induce employees’ wide participation in the process, Article 18 
requires an 80 percent participation rate in “public input and feedback.” Article 
21 states that candidates who receive low ratings in the process will not be 
promoted. Article 19 states that public assessment of candidates focuses mainly 
on five areas: moral character, ability, dedication, accomplishment, and 
noncorruptness. These qualities can be readily sorted into two categories: moral 
character, dedication, and noncorruptness concern moral virtues; ability and 
accomplishment are indications of talent. Moral character, or de, is listed notably 
as the first among the five focuses in consideration. This is consistent with a long-
held party line
50
 as well as the ancient tradition of placing virtue prominently in 
the selection process. 
We should note, however, that in these documents, de is used in a broad 
sense to encompass both moral virtues in the traditional sense and political loyalty 
to the Party. Article 6 of the 2002 “Regulations” stipulates that occupants of 
leadership positions “must be equipped with the necessary level of Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory.” These requirements apply 
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even to those who are not members of the party; Article 4 states that the 
document also applies to promoting non–Party members in leadership positions. 
Although this political requirement strikes us as an unreasonable 
imposition because it is binding to non–party members, it is almost irrelevant to 
the vast majority of candidates. Nowadays, there is hardly a clear official 
interpretation of these ideologies. In most cases, the requirement is no more than 
a matter of lip service. It becomes relevant, however, when individuals openly 
express political dissidence. Most candidates, of course, are unwilling to do so. 
For good moral character beyond political loyalty, Article 6 of the 2002 
“Regulations” includes the following qualities: “Seeking truth from fact,” 
“uprightness without corruption,” “diligence in serving the people,” “being role 
models,” “thriftiness and simplicity,” “close connectedness to the people,” 
“receptiveness to criticism (from the Party and the people),” “self-respect, self-
reflection, self-caution, and self-encouragement,” “opposition to bureaucratism,” 
“opposition to all abuses of power and to using office for self-interest,” and 
“solidarity with colleagues.” It is noteworthy that most of these are new 
expressions of traditional values in China. For example, the formulation of 
truthfulness in terms of “seeking truth from fact” can be traced to the Han 
dynasty;
51
 “uprightness without corruption” has been a perennial value in Chinese 
social philosophy, especially in Confucianism. 
There is little specifics as to how exactly these criteria are measured in the 
selection process. Presumably, during the period of “democratic assessment,” 
everyone with an opportunity for input can gauge candidates by his or her own 
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interpretation and assign candidates with appropriate scores on respective virtues 
accordingly. Furthermore, pertinent considerations are factored in the deliberation 
process when the Party leadership makes the final decision for appointment. 
The 2002 and 2004 documents do not include special provisions for ethnic 
minorities. China has 56 officially registered ethnic groups, with numerous 
minority autonomous regions, districts, and counties. Adequate representation of 
ethnic minorities in government leadership positions is undoubtedly an important 
issue of fairness and social stability. Such a mechanism regarding selecting 
government officials is guaranteed legally in the form of the “Law for the 
Autonomous Governance of the Ethnic Minorities Areas of the People’s Republic 
of China.”
52
 Article 17 of the law stipulates that presidents of the autonomous 
regions, districts, and counties must be members of the respective ethnic 
minorities, and other governing officials in these governments must include 
respective minority members as well as members of other minorities. Article 18 
further stipulates that respective minorities and other minorities must be 
reasonably represented in the governments of these ethnic minority areas. These 
laws set the parameters within which the 2002, 2004, and other related policies 
operate. They provide a remedy for potential social inequalities that meritocratic 
practice may engender. 
The current system of selecting civil servants for leadership positions is 
the most comprehensive and sophisticated in China’s history. The goal by and 
large remains the same: to select people who are both virtuous and talented for 
government positions, even though definitions of these two qualities have 
evolved. Mechanisms in the process have also changed. Compared with practices 
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in ancient times, the current system is indeed (more) “scientific” and 
“democratic,” and it has definitely been institutionalized. The “scientific” turn 
helps make selection processes more skill-pertinent by designing and conducting 
examinations and interviews to actually measure job-related knowledge and 
skills. The “democratic” aspect gives the public some say in the selection process, 
not only regarding candidates’ professional ability but also moral character, 
providing a way to remedy a persistent failure of traditional examination systems. 
Finally, the ultimate decision power lies with the party leadership in the 
institution. This, if it functions well, provides a possible corrective to populism or 
manipulation by public opinions. 
All these, of course, are managed in the context of the absolute leadership 
of the party. The decision power by the party has been maintained as the ultimate 
principle in the entire process of reform. In ancient times, although candidates 
were evaluated, judged, and selected in various ways, the ruling family of the 
empire was not to be challenged. To a large extent, China’s selection system 
remains the same in this regard. In ancient times, loyalty to the ruling family was 
considered a primary virtue; today it is loyalty to the party. The absolute 
leadership of the party determines that the system inherently rewards party loyalty 
more than anything else. Although personal moral character and records of 
accomplishments are taken into consideration, loyalty to the party trumps all other 
criteria. Today’s increasingly diverse society has presented various challenges to 
the monopoly of the one-party system. If we recognize that the interest of the 
country and that of the party do not necessarily coincide, and if we regard 
governmental pursuit of any interest other than that of the country as corruption, 
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then this element of the selection process may well be the greatest corruption of 
the current system. Correction of this defect will require replacing the authority of 
the party with that of the nation in the form of government not monopolized by 
any political party. 
 A  IV. Connections with Individual Corruption? 
We have shown that China’s current system of selecting government officials has 
evolved into a comprehensive and sophisticated one, although its general goal for 
selecting and retaining virtuous and talented officials, broadly speaking, remains 
intact. 
So what does it take if someone wishes to climb the meritocratic ladder 
and become a government official with leadership responsibility? Normally, first 
he (or she)
53
 needs to pass the university entrance examination and secure a place 
at a good university. After graduation, he needs to pass a civil service 
examination and acquire a government post. He then needs to pass another 
specialized examination(s) to compete for a particular leadership position, along 
with other required screenings. After these accomplishments, with luck, he 
becomes a government official with leadership responsibility. Down the road, he 
may be further promoted to higher positions by repeating the last process again 
and again.
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 Thus, becoming a government official in China is one of the most 
difficult career paths in the world. For some, perhaps many, it is also the most 
valuable career path, because it brings job security, social prestige, and sometimes 
wealth. 
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Toward the end of the last section, we raised the issue of corruption 
associated with the party’s monopoly of power. We may call this “collective 
corruption,” as opposed to corruption of individual persons. Individual corruption, 
however, is a widespread problem in China. Here we turn to the issue of 
individual corruption. Because the current Chinese selection system coexists 
conspicuously with severe corruption in society, one cannot help asking the 
obvious question: does the current selection system contribute to these problems 
of corruption? It would indeed appear paradoxical to have a comprehensive and 
sophisticated selection process coexisting with serious corruption in the 
government. Our view is, however, that although China’s civil servant selection 
and promotion system is by no means perfect and is subject to abuse (particularly 
abuse of the final decision power of the party), the mechanism itself is not a cause 
of corruption, in the sense that it does not encourage corrupt officials. For the 
most part, it provides a countering force against it; without it, corruption would be 
even worse. 
There are several reasons for thinking this way. First, we must note the 
social context of the system. China’s opening up in the past few decades has 
brought economic prosperity, but it also witnessed severe moral deterioration in 
society. Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic philosophy as it has been promoted contains 
two main doctrines. The first is that “getting rich is glorious.”
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 The second is his 
“cat doctrine,” that is, “a cat, white or black, is good as long as it catches mice.” 
Although these doctrines have promoted economic development, they have also 
led to a social mentality of achieving one’s goal at any cost, particularly if the 




The civil service selection reform has been developed in such a social background 
and is meant to counter corruption. Even though corruption sometimes penetrates 
the civil service selection processes, the method itself is not a mechanism for 
corruption. Admittedly, within such an unfortunate social climate, any procedural 
method is likely to be ineffective in fighting corruption. The final decision 
process of the appointment by the party leadership at a higher level, for example, 
can be, and definitely has been, used for nepotism or taking bribes, even though it 
is not supposed to be. This, however, is not an inherent character of the system, 
just as corruption in many democratic countries cannot be considered an inherent 
character of democracy or judges taking bribes an inherent aspect of legal 
systems. When upright people take charge, presumably, they will make uncorrupt 
decisions, whether in a democracy or in the current Chinese system. 
Second, if corruption is the norm, as is commonly believed to be the case 
in China, even the finest selection method cannot produce clean candidates; it at 
best yields candidates who are less corrupt than others (this is not to deny that 
there are uncorrupt officials in China). An ancient Chinese saying goes that 
“sometimes generals have to be selected from among dwarfs.” Generals (in 
ancient times) are supposed to be tall and strong. But when they have to be 
selected from an army entirely comprising short men, generals are just relatively 
tall dwarfs. Similarly, when candidates for higher government positions have to 
be selected from a pool of largely corrupt individuals, even well-selected 
appointees can at best be less corrupt, rather than uncorrupt, individuals. 
Third, selection methods, no matter how effective, can only choose 
qualified candidates and yield suitable appointments at the time of selection; they 
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cannot prevent appointees from becoming corrupt in office. Additional measures 
are needed to fight corruption after candidates take office. Within the context of 
the Chinese political system, the main problem for corruption of the officialdom 
is not the selection system but the lack of effective watchdogs to keep 
government officials under close scrutiny. China’s current watchdog system is an 
internal one; the party has its own inspection department at all levels. Although it 
has caught a large amount of corruption, including some dishonest officials at the 
national level, these are believed to be merely a fraction of the actual corruption 
that is widespread throughout the government. The solution to corruption lies in 
an effective mechanism of close supervision through checks-and-balances of 
power; the current political system in China does not have an adequate 
mechanism. 
It is our opinion that, under normal circumstances, when social morality is 
not as widely deteriorated as it is today, the kind of selection process developed 
so far may serve as an effective way to generate good candidates for government 
positions. It is reasonable to think that much of China’s current selection system 
can be continued, more formally than materially, as a key component of 
meritocracy after major changes take place in the country and as the nation’s 
exploration of improved mechanisms for virtuous and talented leaders moves 
forward. 
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